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“A strategy that does not either create or exploit an asymmetry 
constituting an advantage must be rejected.” – R.P. Rumelt [42, p.203] 
 
Introduction 
A recent special issue of this journal [11] reaffirms that economics has improved our 
understanding of various topics in Information Systems (IS), such as the economic value of 
information and information technology (IT) [28] and inter-organizational information sharing 
[12, 20]. The footing of its rigorous definitions, clearly specified behavioral assumptions and 
existing theoretical propositions posits economics as a steady reference discipline that could 
continue to increase the level of maturity in the IS discipline. 
 
Nevertheless, the theoretical contributions of economic perspectives on the role of information 
are scattered and far from comprehensive. For instance, traditional competitive equilibrium 
analysis suffers from the legacy of the ‘perfect information’ condition: it “is not robust to slight 
alterations in the informational assumptions” [53, p.21]. It treats information perforce as free 
good or as equal to any other commodity. However, information is, in fact, not a free good, nor 
does it fulfill “the definitional or conceptual requirements of commodity (…) and insisting that 
information is commodity obscures many essential properties of information as well as 
consequences of information exchange" [7, p.42]. In addition, the stringent conditions of 
efficient market theory by definition preclude firms from realizing above-normal economic 
returns, i.e. rents1. The rigor of neoclassical theory thus limits its ability to contribute to our 
understanding of the rent-earning potential of imperfect information.  
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Nonetheless, economic theories that do deviate from the perfect information condition have 
been developed [23, 25, 53, 58]. Theorizing on the consequences of information imperfections 
for economic actors, these theories predominantly focus on various forms of information 
asymmetry in transactions and markets, such as agency problems, moral hazard, adverse 
selection and signaling [2, 17, 52, 53]. As such, economic theory not only helps explain why 
information imperfections occur, it also clarifies when their occurrence could be exploited and 
what countermoves could be devised to avoid such exploitation. However, they unilaterally 
regard imperfect information as an impediment to economic efficiency, mainly raising the 
agency or transaction costs involved. The strategic opportunities of information imperfections 
for firms are only occasionally touched upon [e.g. 15, 60]. Finally, there are economic theories 
that do recognize the strategic potential of information, as for instance the Resource-based View 
(RBV) [e.g. 8] and Industrial Organization (IO) Economics [e.g. 36]. They have, however, both 
neglected to define an information-related rent type, and focus exclusively on either the product 
markets or factor markets of firms and thus ignore the strategic importance of information in a 
complementary perspective. 
 
Taken together, economics’ service record with regard to explaining the strategic potential of 
information imperfections for firms is –to put it mildly– moderate: an information-related rent 
type fitting the so-called ‘information society’ has yet to be defined; no comprehensive 
explanation for information-based performance differentials between firms exists, and an 
understanding of how and why firms deal with information imperfections in their search for 
economic rents is lacking. Therefore, our aim is to enrich the relationship between economics 
and IS by introducing the concept of InfoRent as a new economic rent type and by constructing 
an information strategy framework that addresses these shortcomings. In constructing this 
understanding, we gratefully draw on various complementary insights from economic theories 
touched upon above, specifically efficient market theory, the RBV and IO-Economics. 
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In the remains of this article, we introduce the information strategy framework and InfoRent. 
We elaborate on the decision-making involved in implementing an information strategy by 
proposing a fundamental difference in ways to address information imperfections and to 
influence the degree of market transparency. These generic information strategy decisions lead 
to four InfoRent-propositions that represent trade-offs around the opportunities for firms to earn 
InfoRent. These propositions are then tested in an empirical sector study of the Dutch leisure 
travel industry through the lens of tour operator TravelCom2. We examine the extent to which 
TravelCom displays behavior aimed at seeking, realizing and appropriating InfoRent by 
mapping its information strategy on the distinguished theoretical propositions. We conclude by 
highlighting our theoretical and managerial contributions and the opportunities for future 
research. 
 
Information Strategy Framework 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) [e.g. 6, 10, 60] specifies the conditions of market 
equilibrium under which markets are economically efficient and rents are precluded in the long 
run. In efficient markets, strategic decisions of firms are not, and cannot be, rewarded with 
above-normal returns. In real life, however, markets that satisfy the conditions underlying the 
theoretical ideal of the ‘perfect market’ do not exist and thus firms can, and do, earn rents. 
Nevertheless, an understanding of the EMH-conditions is a useful preliminary to an analysis of 
the profit potential of various markets [60] in that the EMH inversely explains the existence of 
rent opportunities: market inefficiencies that a market party identifies, appropriates and sustains 
could generate rents. 
 
The EMH-conditions can be divided into three main categories: perfect competition, complete 
markets and perfect information. In the literature different rent types have been attributed to 
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different types of market failure, or rather cases in which one of these conditions is violated. In 
imperfectly competitive markets (i.e. markets that fail to satisfy conditions such as numerous 
buyers and sellers, homogeneous products, no market power and no barriers to entry) firms can 
earn Ricardian [41] and monopoly [32] rents by owning scarce resources or by raising barriers 
to competition respectively. In incomplete markets (i.e. markets that fail to satisfy conditions 
such as markets for all commodities, no public goods, no transaction costs, and no economies of 
scales or production) firms can earn Schumpeterian rents [44] by risk-taking and entrepreneurial 
insight, or quasi-rents [26] by investing in making idiosyncratic or dedicated assets available to 
others. These rent types not only clarify what market imperfections –mostly different forms of 
scarcity– underlie different types of superior performance, they also explain different ways for 
firms to realize rents. 
 
At present, however, rent types that relate to dissatisfying the perfect information condition 
have not been pinpointed, let alone defined3. We therefore lack a proper understanding of the 
nature of the market imperfection that underlies information-related rent types and ways in 
which such rents could be earned by firms. In order to address this inadequacy, we introduce the 
concept of InfoRent4 as a new rent type that can be earned specifically under the condition of 
imperfect information. In case the perfect information condition is not met and price is not a 
‘sufficient statistic’ [21], information imperfections exist in markets. In the presence of 
information imperfections, a market party will earn InfoRent when it is less imperfectly 
informed relative to other market parties and is able to implement a strategy that renders these 
differences so that it positively affects the firm’s ability to maximize the economic value of its 
productive services. 
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InfoRent thus accentuates the occurrence of information imperfections as rent opportunities that 
firms can explore and exploit. Figure 1 outlines the information strategy framework that can 
help firms exploit information imperfections and earn InfoRent. 
 
behavioral assumptions
information imperfections
Bounded 
rationality
(Simon,1955)
Opportunism
(Williamson,1975)
Positive/negative effect on
market transparency
+
InfoRent possibility
seeing InfoRent 
opportunities
EXPLOIT
Business strategy
Required 
resources
Required 
capabilities
allocative ability
Market 
characteristics
Market 
mechanisms
Market parties
possibility to influence market transparency
willing to act upon 
InfoRent 
opportunities
able to act upon 
InfoRent 
opportunities
EXPLORE
Other strategic domains 
(e.g. IT, finance)
Consolidate
Resolve
information strategy decisions
Information 
asymmetry
Incomplete 
information
 
Figure 1 Information strategy framework 
 
Theoretical Background 
In this section, we elaborate on the theoretical background of the framework in terms of its 
underlying behavioral assumptions, the two types of information imperfections that are 
distinguished, and the two generic information strategy decisions. 
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Information Imperfections 
We distinguish two types of information imperfections in the framework: incomplete 
information and information asymmetry. The theoretical origins of these information 
imperfections relate to two common behavioral assumptions in economic theory: bounded 
rationality and opportunism. With regard to the former, Simon [46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51] 
postulates human economic behavior to be intendedly rational but only to a limited extent. This 
kind of rational behavior is contained by access to information and neuro-physiological 
capabilities in the uncertain and complex external environments in which humans exist. 
Bounded rationality explains humans’ limited rational information behavior, known as 
satisficing5: searching for a solution that meets the decision-maker’s aspiration levels which is 
therefore acceptable. “Instead of a complete search for all relevant information, the decision-
maker only tries to attain a subjectively satisfying, yet incomplete level of information” [56, 
emphasis added]. The behavioral assumption of bounded rationality can thus account for the 
occurrence of incomplete information in the decision-making of economic actors. 
 
Economic actors are additionally assumed to display opportunistic behavior on occasion. 
Williamson [58] defines opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile involving self-
disbelieved threats and promises in order to realize individual advantages, which includes lying, 
stealing and cheating, but more often less blatant forms of deceit. More generally, opportunism 
refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” [59, p.47 emphasis added]. 
Information imperfections therefore occur even when parties have identical information and, a 
fortiori, if information differences exist. However, it is not until the information asymmetry is 
coupled with (a) the high costs of achieving information parity and (b) the proclivity of parties 
to behave opportunistically that an information asymmetry6 subsists. 
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Recognizing both sources of information imperfections, they can now be defined as the 
instances in which economic actors do not instantly have complete and perfect information 
about all relevant aspects of market transactions and production, exchange and distribution 
activities, including market opportunities, available technology, costs of production under 
alternative production arrangements, the quality of goods produced and, critically, the intentions 
of their fellow actors; and any new information is not instantly disseminated to all market 
parties at no cost. Taken together, bounded rationality and opportunism account for the dual 
nature of information imperfections, which can be described accordingly by two interrelated 
types: incomplete information and information asymmetry. Bounded rationality explains the 
existence of incompletely informed economic actors, which are a necessary condition to 
informational differences between actors. The actual InfoRent opportunity resides in the 
opportunism that comes into play to use the information asymmetry to an individual actor’s 
economic advantage. Firms can encounter InfoRent opportunities in any market, regardless 
whether they are (strategic) factor [8] or product markets, Business-to-Business or Business-to-
Consumer markets. In their information strategy, firms decide whether and how to address these 
opportunities in their search for InfoRent. 
 
Information Strategy Decisions 
In defining what we mean by information strategy decisions, we draw on an economics-based 
understanding of strategy. Traditionally, strategy scholars that are concerned with business 
strategy draw heavily on economic theory [24, 43], in particular on the Resource-based View of 
the Firm and IO-Economics. Our definition of information strategy falls back on the common 
divide in the strategy literature between exploration and exploitation [27, 57, p.230] and 
Penrose’s [38, p.32] tripartite seeing, willing and being able perspective on strategic decision-
making. Analogous to the economic notion of strategy as continuous search for sustainable rents 
[19, 31, 32], we define information strategy as a continuous search for sustainable InfoRent in 
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which the firm explores, identifies and decides whether and how to exploit instances of 
incomplete information and information asymmetry in the factor and product markets that are 
relevant for implementing its business strategy. Increasingly, exploration for new capabilities 
for survival in dynamic environments and exploitation of existing capabilities for success in 
competitive environments are seen as necessary complements for developing (knowledge-
based) strategies [e.g. 61]. Analogously, external environment scanning (seeing and willing) 
stressed by IO-Economics [39, 40] and internal capability development (willing and being able) 
stressed by the RBV [8, 9] are seen as complementary determinants of profit performance [55], 
collectively covering the four elements of a SWOT-analysis [3]. As a result, the information 
strategy framework focuses on a firm’s strategic factor and product markets for discovering the 
rent-earning potential of information imperfections, and takes into account within-firm aspects 
as well as the surrounding competitive environment of the industry. 
 
Exploring InfoRent Opportunities 
In exploring or seeing opportunities to earn InfoRent, firms need to identify practical 
manifestations of information imperfections. This involves identifying both instances of 
incomplete information and information asymmetry in the strategic factor and product markets. 
From the individual firm’s perspective, instances of incomplete information occur when the firm 
makes exchange-related decisions without being able to dispose of all the potentially relevant 
information required to make the economically most efficient decision (satisficing). In factor 
markets, a firm faces such instances for example when it lacks information about the 
availability, prices and quality of resources at the different resource suppliers, or the intentions 
of firms competing for the same resources. In product markets, these instances of incomplete 
information could for example include a lack of information about customer demands, their 
price and quality sensitivity and the intentions of competitors and potential entrants. 
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Instances of asymmetrical information are found in the occasion that an economic actor has 
private information that is costly to draw level for other actors, and the private information is 
used to the individual benefit of the actor having the advantage. From the individual firm’s 
perspective, information asymmetries can only be identified taking into account other market 
parties and take practical shape as either an information advantage or information disadvantage. 
Whereas the classic examples of information asymmetry in the insurance and used-automobile 
industry (adverse selection or the ‘lemons’ problem [2] and moral hazard [e.g. 5]) illustrate how 
informational advantages are hazardous to economic transactions, more recent contributions 
exemplify how information advantages can be strategically exploited in product markets as for 
instance in product diversification [36] and R&D [1, 14]. We not only adhere to the latter view, 
we also add that information advantages are not restricted to product markets, but can also be 
exploited in strategic factor markets. An example would be when a firm is able to make an 
accurate expectation of the future value of specific management or R&D skills to be acquired on 
labor markets while others underestimate the return potential of such skills [8]. 
 
Exploiting InfoRent Opportunities 
In the exploit-part of their information strategy, firms need to decide whether they are willing 
and able to exploit the identified InfoRent opportunities. This entails a choice on whether and 
how to address the instances of information imperfections in the strategic factor and product 
markets identified in the explore-part. A firm decides (a) whether the firm is anxious to exploit 
the identified instances of information imperfections (willing to act upon InfoRent opportunities) 
and (b) whether it is possible and worthwhile to dedicate resources and capabilities to address 
the instances of information imperfection (able to act upon InfoRent opportunities). 
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The willingness of a firm to act upon InfoRent opportunities and its intended effect on market 
transparency is partly influenced by choices in adjacent strategic domains, such as business 
strategy, finance and IT. For instance, firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy can be expected 
to regard increased price transparency as desirable, while firms with good reputations and large 
marketing budgets could regard increased transparency of price, product, and quality differences 
as particularly undesirable. Market opaqueness allows such firms to influence the perception of 
consumers since their comparison is not objective, but subject to interpretation. 
 
The ability of a firm to act upon InfoRent opportunities is influenced both by its allocative 
ability, i.e. the extent to which it can acquire the resources and capabilities required to 
implement its decision, and the possibility to influence a market’s transparency given its 
idiosyncrasies. These idiosyncrasies include for instance the number and diversity of market 
parties, the level of resource or product homogeneity, the degree of regulation or formalization 
of transactions and the proclivity of market parties to behave opportunistically. Markets 
characterized by many different opportunistic market parties, a high level of differentiation and 
a low degree of formalization in transactions are intrinsically more opaque than highly regulated 
markets for homogeneous goods with fixed prices. In the theoretical framework, we account for 
such idiosyncrasies under three headers: the market characteristics, market mechanisms, and 
possible (counter)actions and opportunistic attitudes of other market parties. 
 
All of the above considerations in the exploit-part can be captured in a fundamental difference 
in information strategy decisions: firms either resolve or consolidate an instance of information 
imperfection. A firm that decides to resolve instances of information imperfection dedicates 
extra resources and capabilities, such as information, IT and analytical skills in order to become 
more completely informed about particular aspects of strategic factor and product markets, 
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while a firm that decides to consolidate does not. This simple difference enables to describe a 
firm’s information strategy as a set of generic resolve/consolidate decisions. Collectively, these 
decisions determine to what extent a firm is able to actually earn InfoRent. 
 
InfoRent Propositions 
In a competitive market, the possibility for a firm to earn InfoRent involves trade-offs since it 
co-depends on other parties’ information strategies. More specifically, it partly depends on the 
extent to which the information strategy decisions of other market parties leave room for 
instances of incomplete information and information asymmetry, and partly on the willingness 
and ability of the firm to seize the opportunity and exploit it to its own benefit. Notably, not all 
information strategy decisions directly aim for InfoRent. The four InfoRent propositions below 
(P1 to P4) provide a theoretical overview of information strategy decisions and the subsequent 
possibility for a firm to earn InfoRent. 
 
P1: A firm can seize an opportunity to earn InfoRent by: 
(a) privately resolving an instance of incomplete information into an information 
advantage, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties, or 
(b) consolidating an instance of information advantage over other market parties, either 
individually or in cooperation with other market parties. 
Firms can decide to (a) actively create an instance of information advantage or (b) protect 
and exploit an existing instance of information advantage. In strategic factor markets, 
private or strategically disclosed information could enable a firm to make a more accurate 
expectation of the future value of a resource than other market parties. This expected value 
differences might not be reflected in the price of the resource acquired, therefore the firm 
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can earn InfoRent in case the resource proves to be undervalued as a result of the other 
market parties’ information disadvantage [cf. 8]. In product markets, a firm can earn 
InfoRent in case its private or strategically disclosed information allows it to maximize the 
value of the productive service of its resource bundles, while the information disadvantage 
hinders other market parties’ value maximization. 
P2: A firm can (consciously) ignore an opportunity to earn InfoRent by: 
(a) consolidating an instance of incomplete information, and thus not privately resolving it 
into an information advantage, either individually or in cooperation with other market 
parties. 
Since some of the information strategy decisions require a firm to dedicate extra resources 
and capabilities, implementing an information strategy can involve costs. These costs are 
associated with the resources and capabilities that need to be acquired or developed, and 
employed. Firms can decide that it is impossible, insufficiently worthwhile or too costly to 
dedicate resources and capabilities to create an information advantage over other market 
parties compared to the expected InfoRent that could be appropriated with the advantage. In 
strategic factor markets, the cost incurred could exceed the expected future value of a 
resource. Similarly, the expected benefit in value maximization in product markets could 
not outweigh the costs associated with implementing the information strategy decision 
required to realize this benefit. In either case, this implies that an instance of incomplete 
information is left as an InfoRent opportunity for other market parties. 
P3: A firm can tolerate other market parties to earn InfoRent by: 
(a) consolidating an instance of information disadvantage that they have relative to other 
market parties, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties, or 
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(b) resolving an instance of information advantage by sharing their private information with 
other market parties, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties. 
A firm can decide to (a) consolidate an information disadvantage, for it is impossible, not 
worthwhile or too costly to draw level the disadvantage that allows the market party with 
the advantage to earn InfoRent. Possibly, the resources or capabilities required to draw level 
the disadvantage are unavailable, the opportunistic practices of the market party with the 
advantage might be very unlikely too be given up, or the benefit of resolving the 
disadvantage might not compensate for the costs incurred. Alternatively, a firm can decide 
to (b) resolve an instance of information advantage for the sake of strategic cooperation 
with other market parties (e.g. strategic alliances, franchises or joint ventures). The InfoRent 
that is earned with the information advantage can then be divided amongst the cooperative 
market parties. A possible motive to resolve an information advantage is the expectation to 
increase the total amount of InfoRent that can be earned from the combined information of 
individual market parties. 
P4: A firm can reduce the InfoRent that other market parties earn by: 
(a) privately resolving an instance of information disadvantage that they have relative to 
other market parties, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties. 
Typical examples of firms that attempt to reduce or draw level instances of information 
disadvantage are for example price/product comparison websites or information-based 
intermediaries (infomediaries or web-aggregators [29, 62]). These firms can reduce or even 
entirely evaporate the benefit of private or strategically disclosed information of other 
market parties by aggregating information and facilitating comparisons of resources of 
different suppliers in strategic factor markets or products/services of different firms in 
product markets. Firms that are able to resolve information disadvantages are in a position 
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to pressure other market parties to give up (part of) their InfoRent, therewith possibly 
creating an information advantage for themselves. 
 
The total amount of InfoRent a firm can appropriate with its information strategy is thus 
determined by the amount of InfoRent appropriated and sustained by each of the information 
strategy decisions in strategic factor and product markets, minus the costs incurred with the 
implementation of these individual decisions. On top of this, a firm needs to be aware of the 
extent to which their information strategy changes the nature, or ‘rules’, of competition in a 
market and the possible counteraction it evokes at other market parties. In addition, regulatory 
authorities such as market or governmental authorities (e.g. SEC) are in a position to limit the 
amount of InfoRent firms can appropriate. These institutions can decide to publicly resolve 
instances of incomplete information or information asymmetry either by law or regulation 
supported by ‘watchdogs’. These regulatory measures are generally aimed at reducing the 
amount of InfoRent that can be earned by firms in order to increase economic and social 
welfare. 
 
Research Methodology 
In order to test the four theoretical propositions on InfoRent we present the results of a sector 
study of the Dutch leisure travel industry conducted during the years 2001-2003. The travel 
industry is suitable for empirically testing the propositions for two reasons. First, since the 
industry is information-intensive, information strategy decisions can be expected to be highly 
relevant aspects of a firm’s strategy and business model. Second, the industry’s low degree of 
informational transparency, indicated by a high level of price dispersion [34] and the growing 
number of infomediaries, leaves room for firms to influence the market’s transparency and to 
actually earn InfoRent. These two industry characteristics increase the likelihood of 
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encountering a variety of information strategy decisions and underlying considerations to test 
the four theoretical propositions. 
 
The sector study included an in-depth case study at three successive market parties in the value 
chain: an airline, tour operator TravelCom and a travel comparison website. In these 
organizations 25 semi-structured interviews were held with managers in various positions 
ranging from managing director, financial director, IT/information manager to managers in 
sales, purchase and marketing. The initial firm contact and the available highest-ranking 
manager were first interviewed to determine the strategic factor and product markets that were 
crucial for the firm’s business. For each of these markets, the corresponding managers were 
identified and contacted for an interview. These interviews were structured in accordance with 
the theoretical framework and addressed the manager’s role in the context of the overall firm, 
some key figures and their perception of the firm’s strategic spearheads, the information 
imperfections that they identified in the market they were responsible for and their analysis of 
the corresponding information strategy decisions. The interviews were complemented by 
written documentation such as company reports, annual reports, industry rules and guidelines, 
and information from the company website and intranet, allowing data triangulation. All 
available data were transcribed, coded with a coding scheme that was derived from the 
theoretical framework and analyzed using a software tool (Atlas.ti) for qualitative data analysis. 
The coded data were ordered in conceptually-ordered displays [35] to relate and confront both 
corresponding and contradictory sayings on information imperfections and information strategy 
decisions in a particular market (full details on the method and coding scheme can be found in 
[54]). 
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The findings of the case study are presented in the subsequent section as a synthesized sector 
study through the lens of tour operator TravelCom. We adopt TravelCom as the focal 
organization for our sector analysis for it is at the center of the sector’s competitive arena: 
surrounded on its strategic factor and product markets by market parties that are confronted with 
and react to its information strategy. The specific choice for TravelCom is justified by its status 
as the most information-oriented travel organization within the largest Dutch travel concern 
with an above-average net margin of 7%, while the industry’s average is 1 to 2%. If, in fact, 
these above-average returns can be (partly) related to TravelCom’s information orientation [cf. 
33], this would have to show in a general trend in its information strategy decisions to actively 
seek InfoRent. 
 
The Leisure Travel Industry: A Sector Study 
A number of different market players operate, transact and interact in the Dutch leisure travel 
industry, collectively making up the value chain (see Figure 2 for an overview). 
 
(strategic) factor markets
Travel component 
suppliers
product markets
Travel agentsTour operators
intermediated sellers
direct sellers
- TravelCom
- Neckermann
- Vrijuit
- others
consumers
- GoGo Tours
- SunWeb
- others
- company-owned
- independent 
Web sites
- comparison sites
- hoteliers
- bed agents
accommodation
- airlines
- coach companies
transportation
- Toeristiek
travel information
- TravelNet
IT-infrastructure
- tour guides
- excursion agents
extra components
 
Figure 2 Industry players in the Dutch leisure travel industry 
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On the supply side, various travel component suppliers offer transportation, accommodation and 
additional components (e.g. excursions, guided tours). Information supplier Toeristiek provides 
objective travel information and TravelNet facilitates the technical infrastructure for the 
industry. Tour operators produce package tours by allotting, coordinating and combining 
individual travel components allocated at various factor markets. The markets for charter flights, 
scheduled flights and accommodation are the core constituent components and thus considered 
as the strategic factor markets for tour operators. As a distributor of package tours, tour 
operators sell their travel products on the product market for package tours. These strategic 
factor and product markets are discussed in turn below. 
 
Charter flights 
The strategic factor market for charter flights has many buyers –for the most part tour 
operators– on the demand side, and many sellers –airlines operating a charter service– on the 
supply side. The set of supplying airlines is relatively stable as a result of the considerable entry 
barriers raised by low profit margins and high initial equipment investments; however, mergers 
and acquisitions occur on a regular basis. The level of product differentiation is limited. Product 
offerings differ in terms of fares, the range of destinations, route (direct or indirect), 
departure/arrival schedule and onboard service. The market mechanism to match supply and 
demand is based on contract negotiations between tour operators and airlines about seat 
allotments. Tour operators can allot a certain volume of seats on a flight to a particular 
destination, for certain flight days, over a period during the season. The allotment negotiations 
revolve primarily around the seat price, which is fixed for about 85% and variably depends on 
the allotted volume, the level of risk-taking7, the flight days and their distribution over the 
season, the total demand for a particular destination, and discounts, promotions and commission 
for the remaining 15%. There are no industry-wide or generally accepted standards to determine 
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the price of an allotment, nor will tour operators reveal to each other their negotiated allotment 
prices. Ideally, the negotiations complete well before the season’s start to allow airlines to 
request the required take-off and landing slots at airports. In reality, however, tour operators 
tend to stretch their allotment negotiations beyond the slot request deadline in order to cheaply 
obtain the last remaining seats on a flight. As a consequence, tour operators have only limited 
information about the probability that an airline will service a destination in the coming season. 
 
Scheduled flights 
The strategic factor market for scheduled flights does not significantly differ from the market 
for charter flights in terms of the market parties involved –most airlines offer both charter and 
scheduled services– or the level of product differentiation. However, their market mechanisms 
differ distinctly. The majority of airlines publish their schedules and commercial fares in GDS’s 
(Global Distribution Systems, such as Galileo, Sabre or Amadeus) in order to make them 
available for booking by tour operators, travel agents and consumers. However, tour operators 
allotting large volumes of seats are in a position to negotiate discounts on the published 
commercial fare. Unlike the negotiations about charter flights, tour operators can rely on the 
commercial tariffs listed in GDS’s as a reference point in their price negotiations. Generally, 
tour operators will not disclose any information on the discounts or allotment prices they 
negotiate. Despite the increasing amount of airlines8 that circumvent GDS’s (e.g. EasyJet, 
RyanAir), the completeness of flight and fare information is not impeded since direct selling 
airlines generally publish their flights and commercial fares on their company websites. 
Furthermore, the future existence of scheduled flights to particular destinations is less uncertain 
than charter flights: they not solely depend on the demand for travel components by tour 
operators, but also on consumer demand. Summarized, the market for scheduled flights can be 
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considered as more transparent than the market for charter flights due to the publicly available 
information on flights and fares in GDS’s and company websites. 
 
Accommodation 
The strategic factor market for accommodation includes the markets for hotel rooms, apartments 
and beds. Amongst one another, these markets differ minimally in terms of market 
characteristics, mechanisms and degrees of market transparency. The market for 
accommodation can be characterized as diverse and complex. The number of accommodation 
suppliers is extremely large and the level of product differentiation is high: price and quality 
levels can differ tremendously among accommodation suppliers. Accommodation is directly 
sold to consumers, via agents and to tour operators as components for package tours. Analogous 
to seat allotments for flights, tour operators negotiate contracts for bed allotments with various 
accommodation suppliers. The volume of beds allotted, the period during the season and the 
level of risk-taking are the main determinants of the allotment price. In determining the 
price/quality ratio of accommodation, tour operators can rely on the commercial fares as a 
reference point in the negotiations on quoted prices, which include discounts for large allotment 
volumes. The commercial fares are generally published in brochures of accommodation 
suppliers and on websites. The main difficulty lies in assessing the quality of accommodation 
and the quality of service, since these are subject to personal preferences and on-site experience, 
and no standardized quality rankings across countries, or quality guarantees are available (star-
rankings are incomparable over countries). Information on the quality of accommodation can be 
obtained through subscription to Information supplier Toeristiek. Toeristiek’s research team 
regularly visits holiday resorts and accommodations worldwide in order to check whether the 
published information in brochures matches the actual situation. These checks include for 
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instance the walking distance to the beach or pool, the exact room size, wheel chair accessibility 
and the quality and availability of guest facilities such as showers, child seats and lockers. 
 
Package tours 
As distributors of package tours, tour operators set prices and volumes of package tours 
depending on the expected sales, the negotiated purchase price of the various components and 
the acceptable profit margins within the aimed target group. The five largest tour operators 
represent 80% of the Dutch market, while numerous small independent tour operators –
unregistered at either of the branch organizations9– represent the remaining 20%. The level of 
product differentiation is high in the sense that large differences exist in tour operators’ product 
offerings. The common market mechanism to sell package tours to consumers is through the use 
of intermediating travel agents. These intermediated tour operators sell roughly 50% through 
company-owned agents and the rest through other (independent) agents. Direct sellers 
circumvent the use of intermediating travel agents as much as possible in order to reduce their 
sales costs and to be in direct control of its sales and interaction with customers. 
 
Besides tour operators and travel agents, other market parties have emerged on this product 
market: increasingly travel comparison websites and travel component suppliers attempting to 
disintermediate tour operators claim a raison-d’être [18]. Travel comparison websites provide 
insight in the fares of individual flights, accommodations and package tours through online 
access to multiple professional booking systems. However, these websites provide either insight 
in the all-inclusive prices, which traditionally are publicly available, or in the fares of individual 
components, which allows consumers to compose their own package tours. As a consequence of 
the considerable economies of scale, tour operators are able to offer better all-inclusive prices 
than the aggregate price of these same components bought separately by consumers. In addition, 
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the attempts at disintermediation by travel component suppliers are bounded by several 
financial hurdles, such as the lack of economies of scale, the relatively high costs of small 
amounts of financial transactions, and a lack of market reach and brand name that reduce the 
competitive edge of travel component suppliers in an industry where net margins are already 
wafer-thin. 
 
TravelCom 
TravelCom is one of the three subsidiary companies of the largest Dutch travel organization. 
With around 200 employees (excluding travel agency personnel), approximate annual returns of 
100 M€ accounted for by around 200.000 vacationers, TravelCom is the fifth largest tour 
operator in the Netherlands. It focuses on offering package tours for groups in the form of 
organized round trips at cultural locations and city trips. TravelCom intends to maximize its net 
margin by generating the highest possible returns on invested capital. At current, the success of 
this objective shows in a positive net margin of 7%, compared to the industry’s average of 1 to 
2%. We argue that this difference can be partly explained by TravelCom’s business strategy and 
partly by the choices in its information strategy. Therefore, the essence of TravelCom’s business 
strategy is first briefly characterized. We then focus on TravelCom’s information strategy in the 
strategic factor and product markets described in the previous section to assess how their 
decisions map on the theoretical InfoRent propositions. 
 
TravelCom’s Business Strategy 
Whereas the majority of tour operators primarily focus on realizing economies of scale in 
purchasing travel components, TravelCom has a demand-side orientation. This orientation is 
tantamount to a concentration of effort to capture and analyze information about its customers’ 
needs and preferences for travel products. A number of data capturing tools, a data warehouse, 
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and CRM-like tools and analysis techniques facilitate the storage and analysis of information on 
past and current booking behavior of customer groups and the results of customer satisfaction 
surveys (average response rate 40%). This demand-side information allows TravelCom to adapt 
their product offering to suit the needs of its customers in around a dozen labels that focus on a 
variety of narrowly defined target groups (e.g. active 55+ seniors, adventurous young people, 
sports-lovers, Christians or single travelers). Each label is approached with a tailor-made service 
proposition, marketing approach and corresponding distribution channel. 
 
In its marketing strategy, TravelCom employs multiple distribution channels to promote and sell 
its products. As a direct seller, TravelCom relies both on its company-owned retail outlets 
(approximately 25 in number spread over the Netherlands), and on its call center, online 
booking facilities, direct mailings and advertisements in newspapers and magazines. The 
company-owned travel agencies account for around 80% of the total returns. TravelCom takes 
an active approach in directly marketing its travel products to specific target groups based on 
previous bookings and information gathered from customer contact (e.g. click behavior on its 
website, interaction with the call center, reactions to direct mailings). The combination of a 
multi-channel and direct marketing approach allows TravelCom to quickly respond to 
unforeseen fluctuations in travel demand compared to its brochure-based competitors. 
 
TravelCom’s Information Strategy 
Table 1 provides an overview of TravelCom’s information strategy, showing the strategic factor 
or product market in which the information imperfections were identified, the source, type and 
specific instance of imperfection, TravelCom’s decision to either resolve or consolidate it and 
the corresponding strategic assumption with regard to InfoRent. 
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Market 
(factor/product) 
Source of 
imperfections Type of imperfection Instance of information imperfection Decision 
Strategic assumption 
negotiation-based 
market mechanism 
information disadvantage 
(vis-à-vis airlines) 
Existence of charter service to 
particular destinations for the coming 
season 
consolidate Tolerate others to earn InfoRent by avoiding the market for charter flights (P3a) Charter flights 
(factor market) no standards to 
calculate allotment 
prices 
information disadvantage 
(vis-à-vis competing tour 
operators) 
Allotment prices that competing tour 
operators negotiate at airlines consolidate 
Tolerate others to earn InfoRent by avoiding 
the market for charter flights (P3a) 
negotiation-based 
volume discounts 
information disadvantage 
(vis-à-vis competing tour 
operators) 
Quoted fares that competing tour 
operators negotiate at airlines resolve 
Reduce the InfoRent of others by estimation 
through comparison with own allotment 
volumes (P4a) Scheduled flights
(factor market) 
negotiation-based 
volume discounts 
information advantage 
(over competing tour 
operators) 
Quoted fares that TravelCom itself 
negotiates at airlines consolidate 
Seize InfoRent opportunity by not disclosing 
information on its quoted fares (P1b) 
amount and variety 
of supply incomplete information 
The range of available accommodation 
worldwide resolve 
Seize InfoRent opportunity by gathering 
information from local agents and hosts, and 
attending professional meetings (P1a) 
difficulty of quality 
assessment incomplete information  
The quality, and quality of service of 
accommodation resolve 
Seize InfoRent opportunity through 
accommodation visits, satisfaction surveys and 
a subscription to Toeristiek (P1a) 
negotiation-based 
volume discounts 
information disadvantage 
(vis-à-vis accommodation 
suppliers) 
Quoted allotment prices that competing 
tour operators have negotiated resolve 
Reduce the InfoRent of others by estimation 
through comparison with its own allotment 
volumes (P4a) 
Accommodation 
(factor market) 
negotiation-based 
volume discounts 
information advantage 
(over competing tour 
operators) 
Quoted allotment prices that 
TravelCom itself negotiates at 
accommodation suppliers 
consolidate Seize InfoRent opportunity by not disclosing information on its quotes prices (P1b) 
potential of CRM not 
recognized; 
intermediation by 
travel agents 
incomplete information Consumer demand for package tours resolve 
Seize InfoRent opportunity by registering and 
analyzing booking history and customer contact 
information (P1a) Package tours 
(product market) 
advertising all-
inclusive prices 
information advantage (over 
consumers and competing 
tour operators) 
The price composition of package tours consolidate Seize InfoRent opportunity by differentiating products from competitors (P1b)  
Table 1 TravelCom’s information strategy decisions
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Charter flights 
TravelCom’s decision to tolerate others to earn InfoRent on the strategic factor market for charter flights 
directly relates to the market’s relative lack of market transparency. Neither the airline, nor competing 
tour operators have an incentive to disclose information about the aggregate amount of seats requested at 
the airline for a particular destination, or the allotment prices that tour operators have negotiated in their 
contracts with airlines. In case they would, TravelCom –in fact any individual tour operator– could exploit 
this information to its advantage in the allotment negotiations. This lack of transparency has made 
TravelCom decide to avoid the use of charter flights as travel component in their package tours as much 
as possible and to use flights from scheduled service carriers instead. As a consequence, TravelCom 
tolerates other market parties to earn InfoRent, however not to the detriment of TravelCom itself. On the 
other hand, TravelCom spares itself the costs of implementing an information strategy that attempts to 
appropriate the available InfoRent. 
 
Scheduled flights 
In the strategic factor market for scheduled flights, the main source of market opaqueness is the quoted 
fares (i.e. price including large volume discounts) that tour operators negotiate at airlines. Similar to the 
market for charter flights, this information is not disclosed, however it can be estimated by analyzing the 
commercial fares listed in GDS’s. Over the years, TravelCom has built up experience in making these 
estimates by analyzing the volumes and trends of competitors in previous seasons, comparing this 
estimated volume with their own allotment volume and calculating the discounts that relate to this 
difference. TravelCom attempts to realize InfoRent in negotiating with airlines on scheduled flights by 
complying with the custom of not disclosing its negotiated quoted fares and estimating others’ quoted 
fares. 
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Accommodation 
Besides the lack of insight in price that is common in all of TravelCom’s strategic factors markets, an 
additional source of market opaqueness in the strategic factor markets for accommodation is the difficulty 
of quality assessment. Whereas some tour operators believe it is the accommodation provider’s 
responsibility to provide correct information on the quality of its accommodation, TravelCom actively 
seeks to gain this insight itself by relying on three information sources: accommodation visits and 
experiences by local agents and hosts, results and trends from customer satisfaction surveys providing 
detailed information on the perceived accommodation quality, and objective information on 
accommodation provided by a subscription to Toeristiek. TravelCom actively creates and sustains this 
information advantage, since it enables to ensure high quality accommodation and to optimally adjust the 
acquisition of travel components to the preferences of its intended target groups. 
 
Package tours 
In the product market for package tours TravelCom faces a lack of insight in consumer demand for 
package tours, basically faced by any tour operator. The majority of tour operators are at the very 
beginning of developing the resources and capabilities to structurally collect and analyze information 
about consumer demand. Possibly, tour operators have underestimated the potential of CRM technologies 
in this regard, or intermediating travel agents have complicated the process of collecting consumer data. 
TravelCom seizes this InfoRent opportunity and does register and analyze booking histories of its existing 
customer-base through CRM and data warehouse techniques. It derives customer profiles from these data 
distinguishing socio-demographics, holiday needs, booking behavior and attitudes towards destinations or 
type of travel. Compared to most competing tour operators, TravelCom has a long history (over 15 years) 
in analyzing customer information. Moreover, its direct sales strategy puts it in full control of the process 
of capturing and analyzing the required information. When in fact TravelCom is able to derive better 
expectations about consumer demand than competitors, it forms an attractive party for airlines in the seat 
allotments negotiations. Moreover, it allows TravelCom to optimize on economies of scale in both flight 
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and accommodation allotments, and to be able to take the appropriate level of risk-taking in its contracts, 
therewith lowering the allotment price. TravelCom regards this competence and the information 
advantage that results from it as one of the major drivers of its success.  
 
In order to guard itself against the increasing price-based competition TravelCom advertises its products 
with an all-inclusive price and inhibits price comparisons of its products with competing products through 
product differentiation. This makes it impossible for consumers and travel comparison websites to retrieve 
the prices of the individual travel components that make up the package tour. TravelCom seizes an 
InfoRent opportunity by forcing consumers to pay attention to the content, quality and service level of the 
package tour, not only the price of the individual components. Consumers are invited to make a subjective 
quality-based comparison, instead of a purely objective price-based comparison. TravelCom can then rely 
on a relatively large marketing budget and an established reputation for offering up-market package tours. 
 
Synthesis 
Table 2 shows the extent to which TravelCom pursues InfoRent with its information strategy. Reflecting 
on the four propositions distinguished earlier, TravelCom can be characterized as a pure InfoRent-seeker. 
The mapping of TravelCom’s information strategy decisions on the four InfoRent propositions reveals that 
the primary focus of its information strategy is seizing opportunities to earn InfoRent (P1a or P1b). In all 
of its strategically relevant factor and product markets, TravelCom actively engages in creating and 
sustaining information advantages, and in capitalizing on them. 
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Strategic assumption Imperfection Decisions Markets (# of instances) 
P1a incomplete resolve privately - Accommodation (2x) - Package tours (1x) 
Seize InfoRent 
opportunity 
P1b advantage consolidate 
- Scheduled flights (1x) 
- Accommodation (1x) 
- Package tours (1x) 
Ignore InfoRent 
opportunity P2a incomplete consolidate --- 
P3a disadvantage consolidate - Charter flights (2x) Tolerate others to earn 
InfoRent P3b advantage resolve --- 
Reduce the InfoRent of 
others P4a disadvantage resolve 
- Scheduled flights (1x) 
- Accommodation (1x) 
Table 2 Information strategy decisions per InfoRent proposition 
 
TravelCom’s management ascribes their commercial success principally to their information advantage in 
the product market for package tours. We agree with their view, but we additionally distinguish a 
secondary focus in TravelCom’s information strategy that becomes apparent on its strategic factor 
markets. Undeniably, TravelCom’s business strategy is driven by its focus to capture the value of 
customer information where competitors have been structurally unaware, underestimating or incapable of 
grasping the opportunities of using customer information and CRM techniques to improve business. As 
the financial director stated: “Other tour operators simply do not have the customer information that we 
have built up. They have never been aware of the value of knowing your customers.” Even though the 
industry increasingly recognizes the importance and value of this information, TravelCom has a 15-year 
lead in developing the skills to gather and analyze customer information and adjusting its business 
strategy and organization accordingly. The head of Information Management explained: “Our success is 
not an incident, but a direct result of our commercial strategy. The sustained competitive advantage draws 
to a large extent on our knowledge of our customers-base and everything that results indirectly from it. 
(…) Knowing our customers enables us to effectively adapt our purchase policy of travel components. In 
the end, it’s all about the customer, not the product.” 
The secondary focus that we distinguish in TravelCom’s information strategy is twofold: (a) to avoid 
markets that are inherently opaque, and (b) to reduce the amount of InfoRent others earn. TravelCom’s 
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decision to avoid the market for charter flights is not just guided by its expectation not to earn InfoRent 
itself; more importantly, it expects others to earn InfoRent at its detriment. Therefore, they tolerate others 
to earn InfoRent (P3a), but at the expense of competing tour operators that do decide to use charter flights 
as component in their package tours. Finally, the information strategy in both of its strategic factor 
markets is aimed at reducing the InfoRent that others can earn (P4a) by preventing them to sustain any 
information advantages. Overall, we conclude from the analysis that TravelCom’s information strategy 
confirms our initial expectation of being an InfoRent-seeker based on its reputation as information-
oriented and its 5 to 6% above-average net margin. 
 
TravelCom’s management team is well aware of the importance of its information strategy and the 
subsequent impact on its business. The financial director affirms: “In general, this view [on information 
strategy and its impact on business] is emphatically present in our thinking. We know that some markets 
are transparent, how this impacts the price fixing and how it influences our possibilities.” He added, 
however, that the information strategy framework adds more scrutiny and completeness to the analysis of 
market transparency, specifically to the analysis of the transparency degree of TravelCom’s factor 
markets. TravelCom’s current explicit focus on InfoRent opportunities in its product markets overshadows 
the InfoRent opportunities it explores and identifies in its strategic factor markets. The defensive or 
reactive information strategy decisions and the absence of examples of information strategy decisions that 
relate to proposition P2a (ignore InfoRent opportunities) indicate that for TravelCom earning InfoRent in 
strategic factor markets is more suppositious than a conscious choice. If it would be TravelCom’s 
deliberate choice to unilaterally focus on its product markets based on the expected amount of InfoRent it 
could earn, we would expect several consciously ignored InfoRent opportunities (P2a) in strategic factor 
markets in Table 2. Since this is in fact not the case, it points to a lack of attention for InfoRent 
opportunities in strategic factor markets. 
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The framework not only forces managers to be aware of and pay attention to the strategic potential of 
information and information imperfections by describing what InfoRent opportunities entail, it also yields 
strategic decision-making on how such opportunities can be seized and to what extent a firm actually 
pursues the available InfoRent in opaque markets. In addition, it points to capability development in firms 
with regard to the (informational) resources and capabilities that are required to implement an InfoRent-
seeking strategy. 
 
Moreover, the TravelCom case has enlightened the information strategy framework in various regards. It 
shows that a range of market and firm specific causes of market opaqueness can be classified under the 
headers of either incomplete information or information asymmetry. Similarly, it shows how a range of 
idiosyncratic considerations can be caught in the dichotomy of two fundamental information strategy 
decisions: resolve or consolidate. Next, the case exemplifies how market characteristics, market 
mechanisms, and the opportunistic attitude of other market parties determine the possibility for a firm’s to 
influence a market’s transparency. For example, a large number or variety of market parties, extensive 
product differentiation, composite products/services and a lack of a quality assurance system are some of 
the market characteristics that make a market inherently opaque. Similarly, a lack of standardized or 
formalized transaction processes and universally agreed upon models for price-making obfuscate market 
mechanisms. Also, other market parties’ opportunistic behavior can take shape in not disclosing sensitive 
information or conflicting information strategy interests. Furthermore, the study shows the importance of 
a firm’s allocative ability to implement information strategy decisions. In case (informational) resources 
and capabilities need to be acquired or developed, an additional trade-off is introduced whether the 
expected benefit outweigh the costs incurred. 
 
Finally, the TravelCom case illustrates that information strategy should be seen as an indispensable part of 
the business-IT alignment issue that is so central to the IS discipline. TravelCom’s business strategy, 
information strategy, and its supporting IT strategy are highly aligned. The information strategy 
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framework underlines this tripartite nature of the strategic alignment issue [30], instead of the traditional 
dyadic view on business-IT alignment [22]. There is not only a mutual relationship between a firm’s 
information strategy and business strategy, but also between its information strategy and IT strategy. A 
firm’s information strategy is influenced, restricted and facilitated by its business strategy and its IT 
strategy. Information strategy decisions can co-determine a firm’s IT strategy and new technologies 
influences a firm’s willingness and possibilities to earn InfoRent (e.g. travel comparison websites). 
 
Conclusions and Further Research 
The theoretical underdevelopment of the rent-earning potential and strategic exploitation of information 
imperfections can be attributed to the legacy of the perfect information condition of the EMH in the 
related fields of Organizational Economics, Strategic Management and IS. At best, the strategic 
implications of information imperfections have been signaled, but have never been comprehensively 
worked out in theory. The information strategy framework addresses the absence of these insights that 
needlessly impoverishes our understanding of the current ‘information society’ [e.g. 16]. Where firms in 
the ‘information society’ increasingly depend on information for their business, information strategy will 
be crucial, partly overlapping or even coinciding with business strategy, in particular in information-
driven firms (e.g. infomediaries and web aggregators [29, 62]). Therefore, theories of business strategy 
and IT strategy should be enriched by a theory of information strategy. 
 
The information strategy framework developed here is a first step towards such a theory of information 
strategy. It provides an understanding of the rent-earning capacity of information imperfections, an 
information-related rent type called InfoRent and four InfoRent propositions explaining generic ways of 
strategically dealing with information and information imperfections. It shows how a firm can create and 
sustain information advantages, can acquire and develop the resources and capabilities to do so, and, as a 
consequence, can earn InfoRent. Moreover, it allows us to test the extent to which a firm can actually be 
characterized as an InfoRent-seeker.  
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Seeing the information strategy framework as a first impetus in overcoming the legacy that the perfect 
information condition has left behind implies that many research opportunities remain. The first 
opportunity relates to the difficulty of quantifying the exact share of a firm’s rents that can be labeled as 
InfoRent10. Part of TravelCom’s success can be ascribed to its unique position as a direct seller using 
multi-channeling in its marketing. However, several direct-selling competitors exist within the travel 
industry that are significantly less successful. We hold that a firm’s capability to explore and exploit 
information imperfections and its capability to combine this into a superior overall business strategy 
makes the difference. In general, the more information-intensive a firm is, the more business strategy 
overlaps with information strategy, the larger part InfoRent has in a firm’s overall rents. This assumption, 
however, needs further investigation, for instance by conducting sector studies in information-intensive 
and less information-intensive industries other than the travel industry11. In this way light could be shed 
on the issue of aligning business, information, and IT strategy as well as on the existence and nature of 
InfoRent-seekers. Other research opportunities include for instance the further incorporation of process 
and competitive dynamic aspects of information strategy and the sustainability of InfoRent. Finally, two 
major challenges reside in examining the consequences of including interpretation and sense-making 
aspects of information into the information strategy framework and to explore the integration of the 
developed theoretical insights into existing theories of the firm in Organizational Economics and other 
economic theories that address the role of information in economics (e.g. Information Economics). 
 
These and other topics need to be explored in order to further enhance our understanding of information in 
economic life and to systematically take into account the economic and strategic consequences of 
ignorance, asymmetrical information and market opaqueness. If so, economics will continue to improve 
the level of maturity in the IS discipline. 
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Notes 
                                                     
1 The strict economic definition of rent holds that rents are “returns in excess of a resource owner’s opportunity 
costs, which is defined as the revenue that a resource (bundle) can generate when put to an alternative use in the firm 
or the price which it can be sold for” [19, p.22]. 
2 The name of the firm TravelCom is fictitious as agreed upon in a condition of anonymity. 
3 In addition, the criteria for successfully adding a new rent type remain largely implicit. 
4 In the economic literature, the concept of ‘information rents’ has been narrowly applied to the analysis of incentive 
contracts and principal-agent relationships [4, 15]. Even though the general notion of the terms coincides with the 
meaning in this stream of literature, we adhere to the term InfoRent (instead of information rent) in order to 
consciously differentiate from this narrow notion and focus on any situation including the principal-agent setting in 
which information yields rents. 
5 Besides Simon’s interpretation of satisficing, other interpretations exist [45]. Nelson and Winter, for instance, 
distinguish between a limited information model, in which there is uncertainty about knowing which state of the 
world is true and a model in which decision-makers have limited cognitive abilities which preclude knowledge of 
which states are possible [37, p.174]. 
6 Williamson [58, p.31] designates this condition as information impactedness; we adhere to the widespread concept 
of information asymmetry. 
7 Several forms of risk sharing exist that divide the risk and costs of not filling allotted seats between the airline and 
the tour operator. 
8 Essentially, low-cost carriers avoid the costs involved with publishing their fares in a GDS. 
9 The ANVR (Dutch Union for Travel Organizations), or SGR (Council of Guarantee Fund for Traveling Money). 
10 The problem of quantifying the exact part of a certain rent type in a firm’s overall rents is not exclusive for 
InfoRent; it is equally relevant for all distinguished rent types. 
11 In general, more sector, or industry level, studies should be conducted in IS [13]. 
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